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Some thoughts on Idealism  There is much misunderstanding regarding what distinguishes Idealism from Non-idealist positions. I think it would be helpful to give a clearer definition of Idealism. I would say an Idealist is anyone that holds that all particulars or tokens (substances and modes on the Ontological Square) are of a mental nature. The words "mental" and "phenomenal" are more appropriate in defining Idealism than using the common definition of an Idealist as someone that holds only "minds" exist. A "mind" suggests complexity, and with many a humanlike, or higher animal-like, complexity. Yet, someone that holds that nature is composed of simple bits of phenomena (whether conceived of as sensations, feelings, etc.) should surely be counted as an Idealist. We could call nonphenomenal particulars "inquals" (from "not a quale."), To be clear, an "inqual" would be a particular that is not a subject, object of any subject, mind dust, raw feels, or extensions of these. Thus, we can say that a Non-Idealist is someone that believes in "inquals" and use as a positive term for a Non-Idealist "Inqualist" (pronounced "in'-qwal-ist"), and call the belief "Inqaulism". The qualities of inquals are often believed by Inqualists to derive from their mathematical nature. Materiallism, the view that everything, including phenomena or qualia, is derived from inquals may well ultimately derive from the view that quality is derived from quantity. Often,  "Realism" is treated as the contrary of Idealism. But many forms of Idealism (such as some forms of Objective Idealism and Panpsychism) conceive of objects to be just as real as Inqualist forms of Realism. Also, some forms of Inqualsm give a very ephemeral conception of objects.Some common forms of Idealism are Phenomenalism and Subjective Idealism (such as Berkeley) who hold that all particulars are (in a phenomenal sense) for or to something. Objective Idealism that holds that all particulars are composed of a substance that is phenomenal or mental. Some examples are "Absolute Idealism" that holds that all of reality is included in a Universal Thought or Experience such as God; Another view holds that reality is composed of ideal universals, and particulars are only reflections of these transcendent ideas (Platonic Idealism); or all is will and sensations (Schopenhaeur); and so called "Neutral Monism", or the view that the world is composed of "raw feels". Panpsychists (such as Leibniz, Schelling, Whitehead, and Sprigge) hold that all objects of experience are also subjects. That is, plants and minerals have subjective experiences though very different from the consciousness of animals. What all forms of Idealism have in common is an erasure of the mental/nonmental dichotomy at some level in regard particulars. So three ways an Idealist view could be established are:  1. To hold that the qualities of particularity and phenomenality to be synonymous. 2. To hold that all particulars are included in some greater category that is phenomenal. For one example, if universals are phenomenal and particulars are just extensions or reflections of these universals, but still allowing something outside the greater category to be nonmental; as in some form of Platonic Idealism. 3. To be and to be phenomenal is the same thing. All categories are phenomenal; or to put it more accurately, the concept of "phenomenal" or "mental" are meaningless abstractions. The dichotomy of mental and nonmental is unreal. The only way to coherently establish an Inqualist view (Materialist, or otherwise) is to show that there are two distinct kinds of particulars, phenomenal and nonphenomenal. This is in contrast with the so-called Eliminative Materialism by Daniel Dennett and the Churchlands that attempt to erase the dichotomy by rejecting all personal experience as "unscientific". This seems to be the epitome of the bizarre, as personal experience is all that anyone has ever known. But that Materialism would eventually attempt to devolve to such a position may have been inevitable, since Materialism seems to require a Reprentationalist view of both our present experiences and our memories of the past. This has led many Materialists to redefine knowledge as the conclusions of scientists (if those conclusions agree with Mechanistic Materialism), but ignore the source of their knowledge which is always personal experience. An abstract philosophy of "knowledge without a knower." Most Idealists tend to reject the Representationalist view of experience and instead hold that we experience the world around us, as well as our past, directly (Presentationalism).

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